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McCrary 1

Behind the Veil: Mysticism and the Reply to
Hiddenness in the Work of Travis Dumsday
Catherine McCrary
Like the Problem of Evil, God’s hiddenness is a difficult subject, not only from
a philosophical standpoint, but from a personal, emotional standpoint as well. We
pose these questions to a silent God like an abandoned child questions an absent
father: With a mixture of both sadness and anger, and the confusion of a childlike
mind that cannot hope to understand. “Why did you leave us?” “Why have you
allowed so much evil to befall us?” “Why won’t you help us?” “Why do you hide
from us?” These questions weigh heavy on the human heart, and their answers carry
enormous import; it is critical that we answer accordingly. I have opted to approach
the subject of God’s hiddenness from the perspective of religious experience and
the mystic tradition. I will argue parallel to Travis Dumsday that (1) God’s
hiddenness is actually necessary when we consider the nature of religious
experience, (2) instantaneous, indubitable knowledge of God (brought about via
religious experience) may do more damage than good, and (3) the monastic
tradition adequately testifies to God’s “visibility.” In this paper, I will expand upon
the groundwork that Dumsday has laid. I will argue that the mystic tradition in
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particular exemplifies both Dumsday’s points about religious experience and
monasticism, while also binding the spokes of his argument together more securely.
It is important first that we lay out the parameters of the hiddenness argument
and Travis Dumsday’s responses to it. The hiddenness argument has steadily grown
in popularity and is now just behind the Problem of Evil in popularity with atheists.
One reason (perhaps the reason) for its popularity is that, like the Problem of Evil,
it is notoriously difficult to answer. Its basic structure has not changed much over
the years, but much of the recent literature deals with J. L. Schellenberg’s
formulation of the argument:
(1) Necessarily, if God exists, anyone who is (i) not resisting God and
(ii) capable of meaningful conscious relationship with God is also
(iii) in a position to participate in such relationship (able to do so
just by trying).
(2) Necessarily, one is, at a time, in a position to participate in a
meaningful conscious relationship with God only if at that time one
believes that God exists.
(3) Necessarily, if God exists, anyone who is (i) not resisting God and
(ii) capable of meaningful conscious relationship with God also (iii)
believes that God exists.
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(4) There are (and often have been) people who are (i) not resisting God
and (ii) capable of meaningful conscious relationship with God
without also (iii) believing that God exists.
And from the conjunction of (3) and (4) it clearly follows that
(5) God does not exist.1

A loving God who wants the best for us and desires a relationship with us,
Schellenberg argues, would assure that anyone who is not actively resisting Him
will at least have access to knowledge of Him and be able to commune with Him
“just by willing it.”2 After all, trust is the foundation of all relationships, and how
could we possibly form a relationship with God if we cannot be certain He exists,
nor commune with Him without significant effort (especially when this effort does
not even ensure success)? This creates the problem of “nonresistant
nonbelievers”—people who are not actively resisting belief in God, yet do not
believe in Him. How could God allow such people to exist if He wants the best for
all of us, and our best is a personal relationship with Him? Much like the Problem
of Evil, the hiddenness argument seems nigh impenetrable, but there is one

Travis Dumsday, “Divine Hiddenness and the Opiate of the People,” International
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 76, no. 2 (Oct. 2014): 194.
1

2
Ibid. Many theologians would affirm that relationship with God is what is best for us.
God’s love for us—if genuine and, therefore, desiring of our well-being—requires relationship
with us.
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opportunity for rebuttal. Just as in a theodicy, the theist who seeks to respond to the
hiddenness argument can escape Schellenberg’s conclusion by providing a reason
for God’s hiddenness, Plantinga’s fabled proposition r that reconciles seemingly
inconsistent propositions p (“God exists”) and q (“Evil exists”).3 Many such
reasons have been put forward by theists seeking to resolve the problem of
hiddenness, but in this paper, I will be focusing on the answers offered by Travis
Dumsday.
Dumsday has written extensively on the topic of hiddenness, offering several
reasons why God might have chosen to hide Himself. However, none of these
reasons offered by Dumsday (or any of those offered by his peers for that matter)
have proved convincing. I believe that those attempting to answer the problem of
hiddenness are plagued by the same problem that haunted the great apologists of
yore who sought to prove God’s existence using the ontological, cosmological, and
teleological arguments for God’s existence: Namely, no one argument was
sufficient to make a conclusive case. However, when considered all together, the
classical arguments for God’s existence make a much stronger case cumulatively
than each does on its own. Similarly, I believe that many of the answers to the
hiddenness argument offered by theists naturally fit together and can be combined
into a far more formidable reply to the problem of hiddenness. I will focus on three

3

Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 69.
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such solutions offered by Dumsday in “Divine Hiddenness and the Opiate of the
People,” “Divine Hiddenness and the One Sheep,” and “Monasticism and the
Problem of Divine Hiddenness.” But before I attempt to synthesize these
arguments, I will sketch Dumsday’s reasoning in each of these essays.
In “The Opiate,” Dumsday argues that God’s hiddenness is a necessary
precaution against “the experience of God” being abused as one would abuse a
powerful narcotic.4 After all, the experience of the Anselmian God has historically
been a life-altering experience “either of utter sublimity, ineffable wonder, and
unspeakable delight, or terror, desolation, and unutterable despair,” at least for
some.5 For Moses, meeting with God for 40 days and nights caused his face to glow
so brightly he had to conceal it behind a veil; for Theresa of Avila, Francis of Assisi
and other mystics, communion with God resulted in powerful ecstasies, which have
been immortalized in art by Caravaggio and Bernini. Should everyone have
“constant awareness of [God] (or at least a constant availability of such awareness)
from the moment [she] achieved the age of reason,” there’s no guarantee that people
would seek communion with God out of love for Him.6 Instead some may come to
commune with God simply for the pleasure of the experience, thwarting the

4

Dumsday, “Divine Hiddenness and the Opiate of the People,” 193.

5

Ibid., 197.

6

Ex. 34:28-35; Dumsday, “Divine Hiddenness and the Opiate of the People,” 193.
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possibility of genuine and meaningful relationship with the divine. This creates at
least two very serious problems right off the bat: (1) Loving and pursuing God for
such selfish reasons rather than because He is “the concretization of Goodness
itself, Beauty itself, Love itself” constitutes “a devaluation of God” and a grave sin;
and (2) using God merely as a means to an end (our own pleasure) makes sincere,
positive relationship with Him difficult if not impossible, and if one affirms that a
personal relationship with God is man’s greatest good, then we effectively handicap
ourselves.7 God would then have at least two good reasons to remain hidden.
In “The One Sheep,” Dumsday hones in on the second of the two problems
presented in “The Opiate” and elaborates it into an argument. In this argument,
however, he approaches the issue from the perspective of resistant nonbelievers,
those who actively oppose belief in God. Dumsday argues that Schellenberg’s
solution to the problem of hiddenness—that a loving God should prevent all or at
least most nonresistant nonbelief by providing “multiple, powerful religious
experiences to every person on the planet, beginning from as early an age as
possible” may do real harm to resistant nonbelievers.8 He gives the example of a
world in which the vast majority of the world population, say 90%, are not only
nonresistant to belief in God but are humble, virtuous people and morally mature

7

Dumsday, “Divine Hiddenness and the Opiate of the People,” 197-98.

Travis Dumsday, “Divine Hiddenness and the One Sheep,” International Journal for
Philosophy of Religion 79, no. 1 (Feb. 2016): 76.
8
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enough for relationship with the Divine.9 In Schellenberg’s perfect world, this 90%
would have rationally indubitable knowledge of God from a young age and, being
properly disposed to do so, would respond properly to this knowledge and enter
into relationship with God. The remaining 10% of resistant nonbelievers would be
free to carry on in their unbelief until they reach a state of nonresistance and
sufficient moral maturity. However, this would result in a minority of unbelievers
somewhat akin to the Flat Earth Society. In such a world, Dumsday argues, “the
10% would not be able to ignore or deny theism, any more than the small percentage
of the population that is born blind could deny the existence of sunlight given the
overwhelming testimony of those who experience it (even if the blind do not fully
understand the nature of that to which they are assenting).”10 It would seem that in
such a world people would be forced into theism before they are ready, potentially
resulting in harms to the individual’s long-term wellbeing or, perhaps even worse,
an outright rejection of God even when faced with the undeniable certainty of His
existence. Thus, God would seem to have another plausible reason for remaining
hidden: to protect the long-term wellbeing of the resistant.

9

Thomas V. Morris and Daniel Howard-Snyder have both argued elsewhere (Making
Sense of it All and “The Argument from Divine Hiddenness,” respectively) that it is insufficient
that one be merely nonresistant to belief in God. Relationship with God—perhaps even simple
knowledge of Him—requires humility and the moral maturity to recognize God as God. In many
cases then, our own moral deficiencies preempt any attempt by God to reveal Himself to us, at
least via rationally indubitable religious experience.
10

Dumsday, “Divine Hiddenness and the One Sheep,” 79.
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Dumsday’s final argument takes an entirely different approach to the problem
of hiddenness than “The Opiate” or “The One Sheep.” Whereas in the preceding
articles he argued for a particular answer to the problem, in “Monasticism”
Dumsday simply denies that Schellenberg’s conclusion, proposition 5, follows
from propositions 3 and 4. Even without a comprehensive answer to the problem
of hiddenness, Dumsday argues, the existence of nonresistant nonbelievers still
does not constitute “definitive evidence for atheism” under certain circumstances.11
He goes on to describe these circumstances by drawing an analogy between the
problem of hiddenness and its troublesome sister, the problem of evil. He asks us
to imagine a world identical to our own in every way except one: Throughout
human history on this world, there have existed communities from every corner of
the earth whose members have been freed from sin and pain. The members of these
communities believe they serve as a beacon on a hill, a “witness to [God’s] grace
in the midst of the wider world of pain and suffering,” but they do not purport to
have a decisive answer to the problem of evil.12 They have no incontrovertible
theodicy that proves God has a good reason for allowing so much and so many
varieties of evil, but then again, they do not particularly need one. The point of the
illustration is that if such communities did exist, they would not need a conclusive

11
Travis Dumsday, “Monasticism and the Problem of Divine Hiddenness,” Greek
Orthodox Theological Review 59 (Jan 2014): 130.
12

Ibid., 131.
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solution to the problem of evil; they are in themselves a sort of answer to the
problem. They suggest that although we do not have a solution to the problem of
evil, an answer may still exist and one day be found. Their existence allows the
theist to continue to affirm belief in an all-good God and to do so on rational
grounds. Such idyllic communities do not actually exist, but the circumstances
described do obtain in the context of the problem of hiddenness, Dumsday argues.
Monastic communities, particularly Eastern Orthodox ones, are just such examples.
To the monks in these communities, God is not hidden or absent. “Rather,”
Dumsday writes, “they live in an ever-growing communion with the divine that not
infrequently manifests itself in powerful religious experiences, in senses of the
divine presence, or even (so they claim) miraculous occurrences.”13 While they do
not purport to have the answer to why God hides Himself from the vast majority of
the world population or why He allows so much nonresistant nonbelief, they
illustrate the possibility of a real answer to these questions.
Each of these articles on its own is not especially persuasive. They each suffer
from their own serious criticisms, which Dumsday readily recognizes. For example,
the so-called “opiate reply” seems to assume that an omnipotent and omniscient
God could not foresee His creatures’ abuse of the experience of Him and the effect
that would have on our relationship with Him. Surely He could have found a way

13

Dumsday, “Monasticism and the Problem of Divine Hiddenness,” 132.

Quaerens Deum

Spring 2017

Volume 3

Issue 1

McCrary 10

to affect the same results but without hobbling the development of relationship with
us. For example, Dumsday describes some experiences of God as terrifying; if our
experience of the divine were more Isaian than Mosaic, the temptation to abuse the
privilege of constant communion with God would certainly be reduced if not
eliminated completely. The One Sheep reply, while it might rescue general theism
from the hiddenness argument (and that’s a big “might”), seems unable to defend
specifically Christian theism. After all, Christianity is fundamentally exclusivist.
Christian soteriology demands belief in the divinity of Jesus Christ, and without
faith in Him, even the most virtuous among us could not escape damnation. Simple
knowledge of God’s existence would not be enough to save Dumsday’s mythical
90%; though they all may believe in God—the same God even—it would seem
naïve to imagine that all or even most of that 90% would agree that Jesus was God.
As for the monasticism argument, Dumsday seems to sink his own ship
immediately out of port. He explicitly acknowledges that “a hardline atheist might
dismiss the significance of these communities,” and even if the atheist were to
accept monastic communities as evidence of the rationality of theistic belief, he
must then square with the patently nontheistic content of religious experiences in,
say, Zen Buddhist monasticism.14 These and several other consequential criticisms
(which in the interest of space I must omit here) render these arguments thoroughly

14

Dumsday, “Monasticism and the Problem of Divine Hiddenness,” 131.
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unconvincing in their current format. However, I do not believe this renders them
useless. Dumsday’s arguments touch upon several important moving parts within
this problem, including subjective experience of the Divine and the rationality of
theistic belief, and it is these insights of his that I believe will be instrumental in
constructing a more robust answer to the problem of hiddenness.
If Dumsday’s three arguments are spokes, I believe we can remake the wheel by
placing mysticism at the hub. Carl McColman, noted author and lay member of a
contemplative Christian community himself, offers several “snappy definitions” of
mysticism while still emphasizing its basic ineffability: “Mysticism is the art of
union with God. Mysticism is the experiential core of spirituality. . .. Mysticism is
the heart of spirituality where all religious differences are resolved and we find
unity in the sacred.”15 Mysticism draws together and unifies Dumsday’s most
salient points about monasticism and the subjective, euphoric nature of religious
experience, while importing a more instructive, more mystic notion of God
otherwise absent from the discussion. The debate over hiddenness can be criticized
on the grounds that it operates upon a highly anthropomorphic conception of the
divine. This is latent in the language of “hiding” and “revealing” that dominates the

15

Carl McColman, The Big Book of Christian Mysticism: The Essential Guide to
Contemplative Spirituality (Charlottesville: Hampton Roads Publishing Company, 2010), 28.
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hiddenness debate.16 But this “peekaboo” notion of God is foreign to those in the
mystical tradition. Dumsday himself references this fact himself in “Monasticism”
when he writes of those in the Eastern Orthodox tradition:
Imagine the modern philosopher presenting the problem of divine
hiddenness to a sixteenth-century Ukrainian peasant. What would the
latter’s reaction be? Perhaps something along the following lines: “What do
you mean God is ‘hidden’? He’s not hidden to the monks and holy elders.
If you want to learn more, go to the monastery. Why does God not just
reveal himself to everyone? 1 don’t know. Ask the monks. And if they don’t
know, at least we have their witness to the fact that God is active in the
world, not ‘hidden’ as you suggest.”17

Even those laypeople to whom God is effectively hidden (i.e. they do not possess
indubitable belief in his existence nor have they had a religious experience) may
not perceive Him as hidden. This is because mysticism emphasizes both God’s
omnipresence and His mystery. God is a spirit and as such He is not “absent” from
or “present” in spaces as we are; as King David wrote “Where can I go from your

16
In the interest of fairness, it is the hiddenness debate. It would seem at least difficult, if
not impossible, to meaningfully interact with the topic while avoiding using anthropomorphic
language. This criticism is perhaps best understood then as a call to recognize this tendency within
the debate rather than as a call to fundamentally alter the language of the debate.
17

Dumsday, “Monasticism and the Problem of Divine Hiddenness,” 134.
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Spirit? Where can I flee from your presence?”18 At the same time, noted
philosopher and theologian Rudolf Otto calls this omnipresent being, or rather, the
experience of it, the mysterium tremendum et fascinans—the fascinating mystery
before which we tremble. God belongs to the realm of the numinous; He is entirely
other, an unknowable mystery that captivates our imaginations, yet there is an
“awefulness, overpoweringness, and energy” in the experience of Him that causes
us to tremble in His presence.19 “The daemonic-divine object may appear to the
mind an object of horror and dread,” Otto writes, “but at the same time it is no less
something that allures with a potent charm. . .. The ‘mystery’ is for [man] not
merely something to be wondered at but something that entrances him.”20
It is no wonder then that Dumsday’s Ukrainian peasant would be so easily
satisfied by the testimony of priests. The mystic tradition affirms what Dumsday
and Thomas Morris suggest: that there is a requisite level of moral capacity needed
in addition to simple nonresistance in order for someone to experience God. If the
experience of the majestic and terrifying mystery that is God was too great for
Moses, Francis of Assisi, and Theresa of Avila, among others, what reason do we

18

Ps. 139:7 NIV.

19
Sumner B. Twiss and Walter H. Conser, Jr., eds., Experience of the Sacred: Readings
in the Phenomenology of Religion (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1992), 78-79.

Rudolf Otto, “On Numinous Experience as Mysterium Tremendum et Fascinans,” in
Experience of the Sacred: Readings in the Phenomenology of Religion, eds. Sumner B. Twiss and
Walter H. Conser, Jr. (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1992), 85.
20
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have to think that such an experience would be wonderful for a nonresistant
nonbeliever in South Asia who has never heard the name of Christ? In fact, as far
as Christianity goes, Schellenberg’s prescription for what a truly good God would
do to reveal Himself to His creation, does not seem especially helpful if these
people still do not affirm the divinity of Jesus Christ. In this way Dumsday’s one
sheep reply, and his argument against hiddenness as a whole, would seem unable
to escape the criticism that it cannot defend specifically Christian theism. However,
this is a bullet I am willing to bite, and not an especially damaging one as far as I
am concerned. In this way, I believe we can still affirm the importance of
evangelism and missionary work while also maintaining that God is not hidden in
the sense that Schellenberg seems to believe. God, like a mystery, is impenetrable,
“hidden” by definition, and He must be so if He is indeed the sort of maximal being
that St. Anselm imagined Him to be (else we should all burn away like mist in His
presence). This does not mean that God is completely inaccessible. Even as we
stand transfixed by the mysterium tremendum et fascinans, God races down to grasp
our feebly outstretched hands.
This gives us some room to maneuver when it comes to the topic of non-theistic
religious experiences as in Zen or (non-dualistic) Hindu monastic traditions. The
issue at hand is not that there exist monastic communities where the members doubt
the existence of God. That simply reinforces what we already know: God remains
hidden to most people, even those who are in search of the divine. What is at issue
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here is the idea that there might be non-theistic religious experiences. If this is the
case, it casts doubt upon the value of theistic religious experiences, specifically
their value as evidence for God’s existence (or more modestly, the reasonability of
belief in God). Orthodox Christianity has suggested that there may perhaps be more
than one variety of religious experience, some being less theistic and, therefore,
less veridical than others. But even if one were to reject this patently Christian
explanation based largely on Orthodox tradition, I believe there is still an answer
open to the theist. However, this requires us to turn to metaphysics. Without
becoming too bogged down in a discussion of the metaphysics undergirding the
phenomenology of religious experience, I believe the metaphysical implications of
non-theistic religious experiences basically comport with theism, and mysticism as
a whole seems to affirm this. Mystic experiences do not fundamentally differ
although their content may change depending upon the specific tradition, whether
that be Sufism, Vedanta Hinduism, or Kabbalah Judaism. McColman affirms this
himself when he writes, “Mysticism is a manifestation of something, which is at
the root of all religion, and all the higher religions have their mystical
expressions.”21 McColman’s fellow mystic, Swami Abhayananda, echoes this
sentiment:

21

McColman, The Big Book of Christian Mysticism, 30.
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Scholars may imagine that a Buddhist experiences one thing, a Vedantist
another, and so forth; but one who has experienced It, whether a Sufi,
Christian or Hindu, knows that It is the final Truth, the only One. There are
not different [Unities] one for each sect or denomination; there is only one
One, and it is That which is experienced by Christians, Buddhists, Hindus
and Sufis alike.22
Although one may indeed be a Zen Buddhist monk and an atheist (or at least an
agnostic), the Zen Buddhist’s non-theistic experience of what Abhayananda calls
“Unity” does not diminish the Christian mystic’s theistic experience of that same
Unity. She simply makes sense of the ineffable in a different way.
The mystic traditions of religions all around the world testify against the
problem of hiddenness, and by tapping into their unique, mystical conception of
God, the replies to the hiddenness problem offered by Travis Dumsday can be
synthesized into a far more comprehensive reply. The both terrifying and
fascinating, omnipresent and numinous God of mysticism is indeed “hidden” from
us, but perhaps not in the way that the anthropomorphic language permeating the
hiddenness debate might suggest. He is accessible to those willing to devote
themselves to a life of careful cultivation of virtue and moral living, and even to

22

Swami Abhayananda, History of Mysticism: The Unchanging Testament (ATMA
books, 2012), 242-43.
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those, the experience of Him is overwhelming, both irresistible and existentially,
unutterably terrifying. A truly loving relationship is one entered in through the free
will of the beloved, and God does not force Himself, even indirectly, upon
nonbelievers. Under this conception of the divine, God remains hidden because of
the limitations we have imposed upon our relationship with Him.
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